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ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS: THE 




This article shines light on a little-noticed but important error in 
United States v. Jones, the recent Supreme Court Fourth Amendment 
decision. In Jones, the majority opinion and Justice Alito’s 
concurrence quibble whether the majority applies “18th-century tort 
law” in holding that the government’s trespass constitutes a search. 
Both opinions mistakenly assert that any unwanted intrusion on 
private property was actionable at common law. While true in 
England, the American law of trespass provided no remedy for 
unwanted intrusions to unfenced land. 
Current Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
recognizes the open fields doctrine, which allows the government to 
search open land without a warrant. There is little indication at 
present that the Supreme Court or any other court wants to overrule 
the doctrine, so the Justices’ nonchalant approach to history could be 
of no import to the scope of the Fourth Amendment. But the error 
could have a serious impact on property law. In recent years, the 
Supreme Court has exhibited a healthy appetite to both expanding the 
regulatory takings doctrine and imposing a judicial takings doctrine 
based on historical nonsense. 
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Before Katz v. United States, 1  a search under the Fourth 
Amendment required a trespass. Without a trespass to one’s property, 
no search took place.2 In Katz, a 1967 decision, the U.S. Supreme 
Court abandoned that approach, and instead found a search where the 
government invaded a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” 3  In 
Oliver v. United States,4 the Court elaborated on how the two tests 
relate. The Court found no reasonable expectation of privacy in open 
fields, and thus no search, even though the defendant had erected 
“No Trespassing” signs around his property to exclude the public, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 2. See id. at 353 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) and Goldman v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942)). 
 3. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 4. 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
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consistent with state law.5 After Oliver, trespass no longer equated a 
search. 
In United States v. Jones,6 the latest case on Fourth Amendment 
searches, the Court returned to the notion of trespass as a bar to a 
warrantless search. The Court held that attaching an electronic 
tracking device to Jones’s car constituted a trespass. Because 
attaching the device constituted a trespass, it was a search, and the 
government was required to obtain a warrant.7 
The majority opinion and concurrences duel on whether reviving 
trespass in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is wise, but all agree 
that landowners always had the right to sue for trespasses on their 
property, including open fields.8 Referencing Prosser and Keeton’s 
treatise, Justice Alito’s concurrence asserts that “[a]t common law, 
any unauthorized intrusion on private property was actionable.” 9 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia agrees that unauthorized entry 
in private land constituted a trespass at common law.10 
The justices and the treatise writers are indisputably right about the 
common law of England.11 The English law of trespass grants the 
landowner a right to exclude from all private land, including empty 
fields and standing timber. But, the justices are wrong about 
American law. Landowners in early America could only exclude 
others from their homes (and curtilage), and sometimes fenced land. 
Landowners could not exclude from open land, and therefore, 
unwanted visitors committed no trespass. 
A review of eighteenth century trespass cases shows that unwanted 
intrusions on open land unaccompanied by theft were not considered 
trespasses. Additional evidence comes from contemporary hunting 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Id. at 183–84. See also Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that 
industrial plants were analogous to open fields, not a home’s curtilage). 
 6. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 7. Id. at 949–52. 
 8. Id. at 949, 958. 
 9. Id. at 958. 
 10. Id. at 949. 
 11. Brian Sawers, Keeping up with the Joneses: Making Sure Your History Is Just as Wrong as 
Everyone Else’s, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 22 (2013) [hereinafter Sawers, Keeping 
up]. 
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law. Hunting, especially on horseback with dogs, is more disruptive 
than fishing or foraging, and so generated more lawmaking. 
Constitutional and statutory protections for hunting, mining, and 
resource gathering on open land reinforce the proposition that 
landowners could not exclude unwanted visitors from unfenced land. 
Hunting was not an exception to the rule. Instead, hunting was the 
activity most likely to be restricted since the hunters were armed, 
killed game the landowners might want for themselves, and hunting 
dogs could harass livestock.12 
In the first part, the Article notes that this is not the only historical 
error in originalist jurisprudence. The second part discusses the scope 
of the open fields doctrine and how it relates to trespass law. The 
third part includes a review of American trespass cases from the 
eighteenth century, the constitutional protections for public access to 
private land, which necessarily limited trespass law, and colonial 
statutes that augmented trespass law, thus delimiting its scope and 
contours. The fourth part discusses the implications of faulty history 
for Fourth Amendment and Takings jurisprudence. Conflating 
English and American trespass laws has already produced a distorted 
regulatory takings doctrine. In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. 
Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 13  four justices 
exhibited an unhealthy appetite to ban judicial takings. If courts are 
going to decide cases today based on the law in 1791, then it is 
important to get the history right. 
I.   HISTORICAL ERRORS IN ORIGINALIST JURISPRUDENCE 
Originalism is an approach to constitutional interpretation that 
“accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the 
intentions of its adopters.” 14  It has been a major theme in the 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Id. at 22. 
 13. 560 U.S. 702 (2010). 
 14. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204 
(1980). 
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American constitutional jurisprudence since Marbury v. Madison.15 
While its importance has ebbed and flowed over the centuries, it has 
acquired considerable prominence and significance since the 1980s, 
first with the Reagan administration, and later with the appointment 
of Justices Scalia and Thomas to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
President Reagan’s Attorney General Edwin Meese announced 
that his office would be committed to “a Jurisprudence of Original 
Intention,”16 which Meese then described: “Our fundamental law is 
the text of the Constitution as ratified, not the subjective intent or 
purpose of any individual or group in adopting the provision at 
issue.”17 To determine what the text meant at ratification requires 
historical analysis since many constitutional terms are no longer used 
or their meaning has evolved. 
“The originalist’s use of history is goal-directed.”18 Originalists 
want to understand the past in order to address the present. To echo 
Professor Powell, “[t]here is nothing wrong with this utilitarian 
interest in history, but it does pose a serious temptation for the 
interpreter.” 19  Studying the past merely to understand it better 
presents less temptation, since the student of history does not have a 
modern ax to grind. Questions with well-defined and certain answers 
present fewer opportunities for faulty interpretations. Where the zone 
of uncertainty is large, as is the case with many areas of law, the 
opportunities for misconduct by motivated lawyers are 
correspondingly large. The legal zone of uncertainty is large because 
the original intent as well as original meaning is often indeterminate. 
Commentators concerned about originalism often point out that the 
Framers disagreed on matters, including those of crucial 
constitutional importance then and now. Even when they did agree, 
                                                                                                                 
 15. In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the significance of the fact that the Constitution 
is a written document. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
 16. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 553 (2003) 
(citations omitted). 
 17. Id. at 554 (citations omitted). More accurately, this approach is textual since the text would 
trump the original intention of the Framers. 
 18. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 669 (1987). 
 19. Id. 
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the often limited historical record exposes the inherent and 
inescapable limitations of originalism. The paucity of the historical 
record does not often reflect lost history, in the same way that many 
of the classics of antiquity are lost to history. Instead, the thin 
historical record reflects that most of the questions of most interest to 
us were not the questions of interest to the Framers. The hope that 
history could provide the answer to contemporary problems presents 
“the fundamental historical error of ignoring the past’s essential 
autonomy. Put more concretely, the founders thought, argued, 
reached decisions, and wrote about the issues that mattered to them, 
not about our contemporary problems.” 20  Moreover, the 
“Constitution very wisely precludes very few policy choices,”21 it 
bars anyone younger than thirty-five or born abroad from serving as 
President. 
Where the historical record is limited, originalism cannot supply 
an answer to a modern problem. But often, originalists have 
committed historical errors that are entirely avoidable. The historical 
errors in Jones described in Part III are not isolated and lamentable 
exceptions, but instead lamentably common. The scholarship and 
jurisprudence of originalism is rife with historical errors; most are the 
product of shoddy research.22 It is important to recognize that many 
of the historical errors in originalist jurisprudence and scholarship are 
not the inevitable result of an opaque and distant past. In 
Rumsfeldian terms, these errors are not “known unknowns,” 23 but 
instead simple questions about the past for which the answer is 
known. Some of the historical errors are so egregious that the most 
plausible explanation is intellectual dishonesty. 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Id. 
 21. Lino A. Graglia, Originalism and the Constitution: Does Originalism Always Provide the 
Answer?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 87 (2011). 
 22. For an excellent taxonomy of errors, see Powell, supra note 17. 
 23. Although the known known, known unknown, and unknown known is generally attributed to 
Donald Rumsfeld, the typology dates to at least 1969. See, e.g., Harold B. Myers, For Lockheed 
Everything’s Coming Up Unk-Unks, FORTUNE MAG., Aug. 1969, at 77. 
6
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss3/1
2015] ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS 477 
The original understanding of the Fourth Amendment is one of the 
most contested issues in constitutional originalism. Lamentably, 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is marred by historical errors. 
The Amendment has two clauses, known as the Reasonableness 
Clause and the Warrant Clause. Two schools of thought have 
developed purporting to interpret the original meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. The first one, the more textual one, suggests that the 
first clause of the Amendment declares an existing right—the 
freedom from unreasonable governmental invasions of privacy—
while the second clause interprets the first one, explaining that a 
search with a warrant would not be “unreasonable” and thus 
prohibited.24 In contrast, the second school of thought argues that the 
Fourth Amendment only regulates the use of warrants. 25  Telford 
Taylor argued that the Framers were not concerned with warrantless 
and oppressive searches, largely because the powers of constables 
were limited and because government officials did not enjoy 
sovereign immunity from tort liability as they do now.26 Instead, the 
Framers wanted to affirm that warrants were a valid exercise of 
government power.27 Relying on Madison’s writing, Taylor argues 
that the great evil that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See e.g., WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 
(2009); JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1, 19, 43 (1966) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment was “the 
one procedural safeguard in the Constitution that grew directly out of the events which immediately 
preceded the revolutionary struggle with England”); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 100–03 (1937). 
Not every scholar falls into one of the two camps. See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, 
Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451, 1478 (2005) (asserting that four principles emerge from the historical 
record: 1) the Framers feared government abuse of power; 2) searches generally required 
“individualized cause or suspicion”; 3) searches of structures always required a warrant; and 4) common 
law principles influenced regulation of searches and seizures). 
 25. See Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved Common-Law 
Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—”Fourth Amendment Reasonableness” Is 
Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 51, 64–65 (2010). 
 26. See TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 27–28 (1969). If a 
government official abused their position, their actions were considered ultra vires and more 
importantly private rather than public abuses. Therefore, the government official was liable personally 
for his wrongdoing. See Davies, supra note 25, at 75. 
 27. See TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 41–44. 
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were general warrants.28 He notes a lack of legislative history about 
the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment and speculates 
that its purpose “was to cover shortcomings in warrants other than 
those specified in the second clause” or “other unforeseeable 
contingencies.” 29  According to Taylor, it was not the purpose of 
Fourth Amendment to prohibit all searches without a warrant.30 
Taylor’s book has been widely cited31 and inspired many academic 
responses, two of which have particularly influenced the Supreme 
Court’s modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: Akhil Amar’s and 
Thomas Davies’s. 
Professor Akhil Amar accepts Taylor’s premise that the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement had no fixed meaning at 
the time of its adoption. 32  Professor Thomas Davies, in contrast, 
accepts Taylor’s historical argument that the Fourth Amendment was 
primarily concerned with civil warrants for government searches of 
customs violations—smuggling. 33  There was no “reasonableness” 
standard for government searches. Peace officers’ discretionary 
authority was very limited (and they were subject to private trespass 
suits), so discretionary searches were not a concern in the late 
eighteenth century.34 During the twentieth century, peace officers’ 
discretionary search and seizure authority expanded considerably, 
well beyond anything the Framers might have imagined, and the 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. at 42–43. 
 29. Id. at 43. 
 30. Id. at 46–47. 
 31. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 169 (2008); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 
318, 336 (2001); Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989). Use of a reasonableness test 
predates Taylor’s book. E.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61–63 (1950). But Taylor’s 
scholarship provided justification for the test by developing a historical argument supporting 
reasonableness. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 27–29. 
 32. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 764–65 (1994). 
Amar’s article has been cited in Moore, 553 U.S. at 170, and Atwater, 532 U.S. at 332 n.6. For some of 
the scholarly response to Amar’s theory, see Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment 
Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First 
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994). 
 33. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 678 
(1999). 
 34. See id. at 552, 624–625. 
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modern reasonableness doctrine is a judicial response to the new 
threat to privacy that such expansion of authority created.35 
Thus, when the Framers debated the Fourth Amendment they 
considered language proscribing only general warrants, but 
ultimately rejected it for the more universal language of the Fourth 
Amendment.36 While some of the Framers like Madison were largely 
concerned with general warrants, the apparent consensus was a 
broader concern with government power and individual privacy.37 
Although Madison provided a draft of what became the Fourth 
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment is largely the work of John 
Adams. 38  Adams had experience with warrantless searches for 
smuggled contraband in Massachusetts and had written extensively 
on the trials starting in the 1760s. The language of the Fourth 
Amendment follows the language of Article 14 of the Massachusetts 
Constitution that Adams drafted in 1779.39 
Most of the historical errors related to the Fourth Amendment 
revolve around the importance and timing of certain English cases 
involving warrants.40 In particular, Entick’s Case has received outsize 
attention, largely because its reasoning was adopted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States.41 Whatever the merits of 
Entick’s Case, it is surely a historical error to believe the Fourth 
Amendment was drafted in light of it. The Boyd Court asserts: 
[E]very American statesman, during our revolutionary and 
formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this 
monument of English freedom, and considered it as the true and 
ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may be confidently 
asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those who 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See id. at 724–26. 
 36. Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 
IND. L.J. 979, 1060 (2011). 
 37. Id. at 1061. 
 38. Id. at 982. 
 39. Id. at 982, 1004–06, 1018–20. 
 40. Id. at 980–81. 
 41. 116 U.S. 616, 626–27 (1886). 
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framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were 
considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by 
unreasonable searches and seizures.42 
But, the opinion from Entick’s Case cited in Boyd was published in 
the nineteenth century, decades after the drafting of the Fourth 
Amendment, so “Justice Bradley’s historical claim is almost certainly 
incorrect.” 43 
Just like the broad reasonableness standard in the Fourth 
Amendment, the exclusionary rule is based on a mistaken 
understanding of history.44 At common law, no rule precluded the use 
of improperly obtained evidence in a prosecution.45 The exclusionary 
rule is a nineteenth century innovation, and a late one at that.46 
The Confrontation Clause embodied in the Sixth Amendment has 
likewise been fertile ground for misreading history. Crawford v. 
Washington, 47  a 2004 Supreme Court opinion, has generated a 
scholarship of historical errors. The case decided when hearsay 
statements could be introduced in a criminal case under the 
Confrontation Clause, specifically, the wife’s statement to the police 
in a case against her husband. Because of Washington’s spousal 
privilege, the wife did not testify at trial, so the prosecution used her 
statement to the police instead. The majority held that the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees the criminal defendant the right to 
confront witnesses and the wife’s inability to testify violated that 
principle: her statement to the police could not be used.48 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion rests on a couple of significant 
historical errors. First, he concluded that the confrontation right was 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id. 
 43. Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The 
Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 933, 
955–56 (2010). 
 44. Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., A Critique of Two Arguments Against the Exclusionary Rule: The 
Historical Error and the Comparative Myth, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 881, 885 (1975). 
 45. Id. at 885. 
 46. See id. at 887 (offering case law evidence that the rule did not exist until around 1875). 
 47. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 48. Id. at 40, 68. 
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limited to testimonial statements that were comparable to framing-era 
depositions of witnesses of crimes. Second, he concluded that out-of-
court testimonies could be admissible only if the defendant had an 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.49 But he is wrong on both 
counts, largely as a result of two elementary errors. His treatment of 
history is spotty and obviously a search for a particular answer rather 
than the correct one.50 He cited to only two individuals from the 
ratification debates, neither of whom appears to be a lawyer, both of 
whom were reading long lists of complaints about the Constitution 
based on “broader political theory,” not specific concerns about trial 
practice. 51  Specific conclusions that Justice Scalia tries to justify 
cannot be justified with the evidence he offers.52 
In trying to divine the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, 
Justice Scalia spends much of his opinion in Crawford discussing the 
Marian bail and committal statutes dating to the sixteenth century.53 
But the Marian statutes are largely irrelevant as historical evidence 
for what the Confrontation Clause meant in 1791.54 First, there is no 
evidence that the elites who drafted the Sixth Amendment objected to 
Marian statutes, since those statutes were generally used to prosecute 
the poor.55 Instead, there is ample evidence that elites, particularly 
those most active during the War of Independence, were concerned 
about the efforts taken by the English to prevent smuggling.56 A more 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Thomas Y. Davies, What Did The Framers Know, And When Did They Know It? Fictional 
Originalism in Crawford V. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 107 (2005) [hereinafter, Davies, 
What, When]. 
 50. See Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine?, 
71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 77–78 (2005). 
 51. Id. at 81–82. 
 52. See id. at 38, 77–78 (arguing that the evidence presented does not match the conclusions). 
 53. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43–44, 46, 50, 52–53. Since the statutes were passed while Mary was 
Queen, the bail and committal statutes are called Marian. 1 & 2 Phil. & M., ch. 13 (1554) and 2 & 3 
Phil. & M., ch. 10, 11 (1555). See generally John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at 
Common Law, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 313 (1973) (describing the common law before and after the 
Marian statutes). 
 54. See Davies, What, When, supra note 49, at 115–17. 
 55. Kirst, supra note 50, at 78. 
 56. Id. 
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general problem for this line of inquiry is that there are no references 
to English common law in the ratification debates.57 
Professor Kirst argues the historical errors at issue in Crawford 
reflect a general problem in presentist history. It can be misleading 
for the scholar to look back and identify a historical progression. To 
the people living in what is later identified as a historical progression, 
it is impossible to know what will happen. Their perception of the 
importance of historical antecedents will be substantially different 
than to someone reading that history centuries later.58 
II.   OPEN FIELDS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
By its terms, the Fourth Amendment protects “persons, houses, 
papers, and effects.”59 Courts have extended the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment from the home to the curtilage.60 Deriving from 
Old French for court, yard, or garden,61  the curtilage is the area 
around the house, often enclosed, so intimately bound up with the 
house that intruding upon the curtilage is tantamount to entering the 
home. 62  Treating curtilage like the home has been a constant in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 63  The protections afforded the 
curtilage, however, do not extend to the area beyond, usually referred 
to as open fields, regardless of whether the land is “neither ‘open’ nor 
a ‘field’ as those terms are used in common speech.”64 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 82. 
 58. Id. at 84–85. 
 59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 60. S. Bryan Lawrence III, Curtilage or Open Fields?: Oliver v. United States Gives Renewed 
Significance to the Concept of Curtilage in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 795, 796 
(1985). Curtilage is traditionally the outbuildings and the land surrounding the home. Id. 
 61. Id. at 796 n.7. 
 62. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (establishing a four-factor test for 
curtilage). 
 63. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 466 (1928). 
 64. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 n.11 (1984)). 
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A.   From Castle to Phone Booth 
The first articulation of a limit on government authority to search 
comes from Semayne’s Case where the case reporter, Sir Edward 
Coke, described the home as a “castle and fortress.” 65  By 1765, 
English courts had applied trespass law as a “ready benchmark” for 
the proper balance between individual rights and government power, 
and nineteenth century American courts followed their lead.66 
In England, trespass was a robust remedy. Under the laws of 
England, “every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is 
a trespass.” 67  Entering property without permission constituted 
trespass and was actionable, even if it caused no actual harm.68 The 
choice of trespass as a “ready benchmark” of a Fourth Amendment 
search could be a procedural quirk as much as a conscious decision 
by the English bench.69 In similar cases, aggrieved plaintiffs pled 
other actions, but American jurisprudence has largely followed one 
case, pleaded in trespass. 
Entick v. Carrington70 is the 1765 decision that is quoted for the 
proposition that a government search involving trespass requires a 
warrant. Royal messengers broke into and searched the home of John 
Entick, a writer suspected of producing “very seditious” 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Seymayne’s Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.). 
 66. Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the ‘Reasonable Expectation of Privacy’: An Emerging Tripartite 
Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1083 (1987). Although widely accepted, this narrative is somewhat 
misleading since the plaintiff pleaded trespass in Entick’s Case; trespass was not a metaphor, but instead 
the cause of action. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626 (discussing Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 
(C.P.), 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1030). Later cases, however, appear to treat the use of trespass as 
a metaphor. See id. at 627–630 (using trespass law to define the expectation of privacy the Framers 
intended to protect). 
 67. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P.), 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1066. The 
King’s messengers had an invalid warrant. Id. at 1037, 1074. Note that this case report was not 
published until the early nineteenth century, so the Framers would have been aware of the trial and some 
of the arguments made but would not have seen these quotations. 
 68. Id. at 1066. “By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is 
a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my license, but he is liable to an action, 
though the damage be nothing.” Id. 
 69. In Wilkes v. Wood, on facts virtually identical to those of Entick’s Case, Wilkes sued the King’s 
messengers for false imprisonment. Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P.). See also Clancy, 
supra note 36, at 1006–1007. Had the U.S. Supreme Court chosen to elevate Wilkes like Entick’s Case, 
then Fourth Amendment jurisprudence might borrow from habeas corpus law instead of trespass. 
 70. 19 Howell’s St. Tr. 1029. 
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newsletters. 71  Entick was arrested and detained, but ultimately 
released. Although he was released, Entick feared subsequent trial, so 
he sued the king’s messenger for trespass, hoping to avoid conviction 
based on the content of the documents seized.72 Trespass was the 
appropriate tort action in the eighteenth century for unlawful entry, 
since other modern torts were unavailable. 
While the English authorities were concerned about sedition in 
England, the colonial governments were more concerned with 
smuggling. In America, authorities were searching for contraband, 
not sedition.73 After independence, the government’s interest evolved 
into the search for “moonshine whiskey” 74  and, more recently, 
narcotics. 75  During colonial times, authorities issued warrants to 
search and recover stolen goods, and to combat smuggling. Unlike 
now, warrants issued for stolen goods were issued to the victim of the 
theft. After receiving the warrant, he could go to the place specified 
with a constable to search for the goods. The only government-
initiated searches were those for smuggled goods.76 
The meaning of the Fourth Amendment has puzzled courts and 
academics. The U.S. Supreme Court has vacillated between the 
competing views of the relationship between the Reasonableness and 
Warrant Clauses. In particular the Court’s earlier opinions seem to 
assume that a warrant complying with the Warrant Clause was 
always necessary,77 though some of the more modern cases reaffirm 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. at 1030. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886). 
 74. See, e.g., Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924). 
 75. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173 (1984). 
 76. See Clancy, supra note 36, at 990–92 (noting the disparity between warrant disputes in America 
and England). 
 77. See Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932) (finding that failure to obtain a warrant before 
searching a garage, when there was “abundant opportunity” to do so, necessitated suppression of 
evidence); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925) (“While the question has never been 
directly decided by this court, it has always been assumed that one’s house cannot lawfully be searched 
without a search warrant.”); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 316–17 (1921) (finding that the 
government could not search a house without a warrant); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393–94 
(1914) (“The United States marshal could only have invaded the house of the accused when armed with 
a warrant issued as required by the Constitution . . . .”); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) 
(asserting that a warrant based on probable cause was necessary to search a letter in the mail). 
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the position that warrantless searches and seizures are per se 
unreasonable, with a few well established exceptions. 78  On other 
occasions, the Court has taken the opposite position, holding that 
reasonableness of the government’s search depends on the totality of 
the circumstances.79 
After ratification, the Fourth Amendment produced little 
commentary and even less litigation. The first U.S. Supreme Court 
case to discuss the Fourth Amendment in any depth is Boyd v. United 
States.80 In Boyd, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of 
Entick’s Case.81 In 1884, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District 
of New York sought the forfeit of thirty-five cases of plate glass, 
imported without the payment of customs duty.82  Boyd quotes at 
length from Entick’s Case, including language where trespass is 
identified as the measure of governmental invasion.83 
In 1924, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that open fields were not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment—a case of first impression.84 In 
Hester v. United States, revenue officers had approached the home of 
a suspected moonshiner. Seeing the officers, Hester and another 
moonshiner fled, discarding their bottles of untaxed spirits.85  The 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S 332, 346–47 (2009) (allowing a search without a warrant 
where the peace officers face an actual and continuing threat to their safety); California v. Acevedo, 500 
U.S. 565, 580–81 (1991) (allowing police to search a vehicle, including the contents of sealed 
containers); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 391, 393 (1978) (allowing a search without a warrant if 
exigent circumstances exist); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 & n.19 (1967) (referencing the 
exceptions recognized before 1967). 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 42 (2003) (rejecting the lower court’s categorical 
approach in favor of a totality of circumstances test as a measure of reasonableness); United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (holding that the “general” approach to measuring reasonableness 
examines the totality of circumstances); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1950) (“The 
relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was 
reasonable. That criterion in turn depends upon the facts and circumstances—the total atmosphere of the 
case.”), overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 80. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 81. Id. at 626–29; see also Thomas K. Clancy, What is a “Search” Within the Meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 14 (2006); Wilkins, supra note 66, at 1083. 
 82. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617. 
 83. Id. at 627. 
 84. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924); see also Susan Gellman, Comment, Affirmation 
of the Open Fields Doctrine: The Oliver Twist, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 729, 729, 730 (1985). 
 85. Hester, 265 U.S. at 58. 
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Court found that the officers did not need a warrant to search open 
fields. The Court held that the distinction between open fields and 
“the house is as old as the common law.”86 Rather cryptically, the 
opinion cites Blackstone’s discussion of burglary, possibly because 
the English law of trespass differed from American law.87 
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Hester is often seen as an 
anomaly, an exception to the rule of trespass. The opinion itself 
provides little guidance on whether open fields are an exception to 
the general rule that any incursion of private land was a trespass or an 
application of the settled law that access to unenclosed land was not a 
trespass. The historical research presented in the following sections 
shows that Hester is not an exception. Rather, trespass law did not 
extend to open fields, and therefore the Fourth Amendment 
protections could not and do not extend to open fields. 
As further evidence that open fields are not an exception to 
trespass, but instead an application of the doctrine, Hester did not 
mark a retreat from trespass analysis. Four years later, the Court 
found that wiretapping did not require a search warrant since there 
was no trespass of the defendant’s property.88 Similarly, electronic 
monitoring of a conversation within the home was not protected so 
long as the government did not commit a trespass. 89  However, 
touching the home required a warrant because it constituted a 
trespass. 90  In Silverman v. United States, the Court distinguished 
between eavesdropping that required a physical invasion and that 
which did not.91 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. at 59. 
 87. Id. (citing “4 Bl.Comm. 223, 225, 226”). 
 88. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751 (1952) (finding no trespass where government agents 
wore a wire); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 89. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 131, 134 (1942) (finding no trespass where government 
amplified the vibrations emanating through a wall), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967). 
 90. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S 505, 506–507, 512 (1961) (finding a trespass and therefore 
a search where government attached a device to the home). 
 91. Id. at 511. 
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In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court in Katz v. United States 
abandoned its trespass analysis, finding a search when no property 
interest had been violated. Katz had used a public telephone booth to 
transmit an illegal wager which was recorded by a device that FBI 
agents attached to the outside of the booth. The Court nonetheless 
noted that Katz’s privacy “expectation [was one] that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”92 The Court found that the 
lack of a trespass had no constitutional relevance to whether a search 
had occurred. Instead, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”93 
Without the clear framework of “technical trespass under local 
property law,”94 the Court has looked for guidance in a variety of 
places. In United States v. Chadwick, the Court considered the 
probable intention of the Framers.95 In Payton v. New York, the Court 
reaffirmed the understanding that the home enjoys special 
protection.96 
While Katz clearly overruled earlier eavesdropping cases, its effect 
on Hester and the open fields doctrine is less clear. Gellman suggests 
that Katz did not overturn Hester because the “facts of Hester simply 
did not meet the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test.” 97 
Counsel for both parties in Katz argued that open fields were the 
paradigmatic example of areas lacking constitutional protection, but 
the Court rejected that reasoning, holding that the “the correct 
solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted 
by incantation of the phrase ‘constitutionally protected area.’”98 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348, 353, 361. 
 93. Id. at 351–53 (citations omitted). 
 94. Id. at 353 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
 95. 433 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1977). 
 96. 445 U.S. 573, 596–97 & n.45 (1980). 
 97. Gellman, supra note 84, at 734. 
 98. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350, 351 n.8; see also Lawrence, supra note 60, at 803. 
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In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed Hester, holding that a 
search warrant was not required for entering open fields.99 In Air 
Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa, a state health inspector 
entered the company’s open fields to measure air pollution. The 
Court noted that the “field inspector did not enter the plant or offices. 
He was not inspecting stacks, boilers, scrubbers, flues, grates, or 
furnaces; nor was his inspection related to respondent’s files or 
papers.”100 The Court did not consider whether entering land without 
landowner permission was a trespass under Colorado law.101 
Ten years later, the Court affirmed Hester in a longer and more-
detailed opinion. In Oliver v. United States, the Court clarified that 
“no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields” and 
furthermore that open fields are not “‘effects’ within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.” 102  Oliver was suspected of cultivating 
cannabis. Ignoring a locked gate and “No Trespassing” signs, 
narcotics agents searched Oliver’s land and found cannabis 
cultivation. The Court noted that “[t]he existence of a property right 
is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are 
legitimate.”103 
Whether a particular government action was a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore required a warrant, 
revolved around social expectations, not property law. The Court 
held that “fields do not provide the setting for those intimate 
activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government 
interference or surveillance.”104 The Court concluded by holding that 
“[t]here is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those 
activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open 
fields.”105 After Oliver, a trespass makes a search unreasonable, but 
not every unreasonable search means that the government trespassed. 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974). 
 100. Id. at 862–63, 864–65. 
 101. The word trespass does not appear in the opinion. Id. 
 102. 466 U.S. 170, 176, 180 (1984). 
 103. Id. at 173, 182, 183. 
 104. Id. at 179. 
 105. Id. at 179. 
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In the absence of trespass, an invasion of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy makes a search unreasonable.106 
B.   Like a Bad Penny 
Jones was widely seen as a milestone in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence because it has the potential to be the most important 
case since Katz.107 The potential impact of Jones is uncertain, largely 
because the three opinions—the majority opinion and two 
concurrences—take such different approaches. 108  Commentators 
have reacted with both praise and scorn.109 Many agree that Jones 
raises at least as many questions as it answers; again, this reaction is 
hardly surprising given the tripartite outcome.110 
Before Jones, there were concerns whether the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test articulated in Katz could protect the 
privacy of citizens in an era of rapidly advancing technology.111 One 
of the few conclusions one can draw from the three opinions is that 
nine justices agree that citizens’ privacy should not shrink in the face 
of technology. 112  Five of the justices interpreted the reasonable 
expectation of privacy as reasonable in light of social expectations 
rather than technological possibility. Specifically, five justices held 
that long-term GPS monitoring conflicted with a reasonable 
expectation that the public was not under continuous observation and 
monitoring.113 
                                                                                                                 
 106. The Court did not consider whether Oliver had posted his land consistent with Kentucky’s 
posting statute, which would give him a trespass remedy for unwanted invasions. In 1984, Kentucky law 
made crossing a fence to enter private land a trespass, but allowed entering private land not surrounded 
by a fence. Act of Mar. 30, 1976, 1976 Ky. Acts 500, 500–501. Today, Kentucky trespass law makes no 
distinction between fenced and unfenced law. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150.092 (1996). 
 107. Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking out of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United States v. Jones 
and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012). 
 108. Id. at 17. 
 109. Daniel T. Pesciotta, Note, I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and the Fourth Amendment in the 21st 
Century, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 230–32 (2012). 
 110. Lauren Millcarek, Comment, Eighteenth Century Law, Twenty-First Century Problems: Jones, 
GPS Tracking, and the Future of Privacy, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1101, 1108–09 & n.79 (2012). 
 111. Pesciotta, supra note 109, at 189. 
 112. Id. at 190. 
 113. Id. at 213. 
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Until Katz, trespass was the yardstick of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Trespass delineated the boundaries of search and thus, 
when the government needed a warrant. Jones appears to have 
revived trespass as the measure of search, but not current trespass 
law. Instead, Jones looks to trespass law in 1791, but describes that 
law incorrectly. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia writes that 
any unauthorized entry in private land constituted a trespass at 
common law. 114  He describes English trespass law—barring any 
entry on private property—as a “monument of English freedom” that 
was “undoubtedly familiar” to the Framers at the time they were 
drafting the constitution.115 Justice Alito’s concurrence agrees. He 
refers to Prosser and Keeton’s treatise, saying that “[a]t common law, 
any unauthorized intrusion on private property was actionable.”116 
The remainder of this Article shows that both the majority and the 
concurrence correctly describe the law of England. They are wrong 
about the law in colonial America. The next Part describes trespass 
law in colonial America and the early Republic. The open fields 
doctrine is consistent with both Katz and Jones since trespass law in 
1791 did not grant the landowner the power to exclude unwanted 
visitors from open land. 
III.   TRESPASS IN 1791 
Both opinions in Jones equate American trespass law in 1791 with 
English trespass law. This Part describes the distinctly American 
property law tradition that developed soon after first settlement and 
continued until long after ratification of the Fourth Amendment. In 
Part III.A, a review of eighteenth century case law shows that the 
doctrines identified in Jones were not present in American law. Part 
III.B describes the state constitutional provisions that enshrined a 
trespass law very different from that of England. Finally, Part III.C 
                                                                                                                 
 114. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949, 953 (2012). 
 115. Id. at 949 (quoting Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989)). 
 116. Id. at 958. 
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details a variety of colonial and early Republic statutes that shed light 
on the content of trespass in American common law. 
A.   Trespass in the Eighteenth Century Case Law 
At common law, trespass was used to mean several different 
wrongs unrelated to land. These now-archaic uses of trespass 
dominate the eighteenth century case law. The word “trespass” 
appears in 409 reported cases between 1701 and 1800. 
1.   A Pleading for All Seasons 
During the eighteenth century, trespass actions were most 
frequently filed to resolve competing claims of ownership. Of these, 
trespass quare clausum fregit was the most common, available to one 
in lawful possession of the land against unlawful incursions. 117 
Unlike a suit to resolve title, which was often protracted and messy 
because of poorly maintained records, a possessory trespass suit was 
a quicker and simpler way to resolve the dispute.118 
Trespass was not merely a suit to determine ownership. An action 
of trespass was often used for wrongs that now would be litigated as 
torts. Violent wrongs were pled as trespass vi et armis, while other 
wrongs were pled as trespass on the case.119 Occasionally, trespass 
was pleaded in cases of sexual misconduct.120 Other cases appear to 
use trespass as a non-specific synonym for wrong, similar to its use 
centuries earlier.121 
                                                                                                                 
 117. E.g., Bishop v. Bishop, 1 Del. Cas. 386 (1795) (dispute between heirs). Colonial statutes often 
regulated or amended the common law action of quare clausum fregit. Act of Mar. 27, 1713, ch. 196, 
1713 Pa. Laws 89, 91 (allowing defendants to disclaim a property claim where the trespass was 
involuntary). 
 118. Responding to the difficulty, states often enacted statutes that regulated trespass suits to try title. 
See, e.g., Act of Dec. 20, 1791, 1791 S.C. Acts 9, 13 (“trespass brought to try the title to land”); Act of 
Dec. 21, 1799, 1799 S.C. Acts 49, 55 (“trespass to try titles to lands”). 
 119. Trespass vi et armis and on the case are distinguished in a dispute over a servant who switched 
employers. Legaux v. Feasor, 1 Yeates 586, 587 (Pa. 1795). 
 120. E.g., Stout v. Prall, 1 N.J.L. 79, 79, 80 (1791) (finding exemplary damages appropriate for 
“seduction and getting with child”). 
 121. E.g., State v. Ingles, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 4 (Super. Ct. 1797) (“The State cannot divide an offense, 
consisting of several trespasses into as many indictments as there are acts of trespass”); Town of Somers 
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In three eighteenth century trespass cases, someone entered land 
without claiming ownership and removed something of value. In 
Massachusetts, the defendants had removed clams without landowner 
permission. 122  In Connecticut, one defendant logged without 
permission, while another removed honey. 123  In these cases, the 
owner pleaded trespass when the real offense was theft. Clams, 
timber, and honey were all valuable property, all removed without 
right by the defendants. The dearth of cases does not reflect the paltry 
damages. Parties were willing to litigate even the smallest trifles.124 
In no reported eighteenth century case did a landowner sue an 
unauthorized intruder merely for intruding—the modern meaning of 
trespass. The paucity of cases does not conform to the conventional 
wisdom that the colonies inherited the common law from England. 
Blackstone notes that damages need not be proved to recover for 
“EVERY unwarrantable entry on another’s soil.”125 But Blackstone’s 
doctrine was not accepted in the American colonies. The absence of 
trespass cases for mere entry reflects a distinctly American property 
law tradition.126 
2.   New Laws for a New Land 
The colonists who settled America left a crowded island with 
clearly demarcated boundaries and intensive land use. In contrast to 
                                                                                                                 
v. Town of Barkhamstead, 1 Root 398 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1792) (stating a foreign pauper “belongs to the 
state to provide for; Barkhamstead’s sending him to Somers was a trespass, for which this action lies”). 
 122. Proprietors of Common and Undivided Lands in Ipswich v. Herrick, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 529, 
532–33 (1772). 
 123. Merrils v. Goodwin, 1 Root 209, 209 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1790) (removing honey without 
permission); Phelps v. Sanford, 1 Kirby 343, 343 (Conn. Super. Ct.1787) (logging without permission). 
 124. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 177 (N.Y. 1805) (appellate litigation over a fox pelt). 
 125. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *209 (capitalization in original). 
 126. Despite the popularity of citing to Blackstone’s treaty, trespass is not the only English common 
law doctrine that was only partly received in America. In England, all game was owned and there 
existed qualification statutes. Hunting Act, 1389, 13 Rich. 2, c. 13 (Eng.). In 1831, the qualification 
system was replaced by licensing and landowner permission for hunting. Game Act, 1831, 1& 2 Will. 4, 
c. 32, §§ 1, 6 (Eng.). 
  In America, however, wild game was “no persons Property till taken in Hunting.” 1744 Conn. 
Pub. Acts 538. In fact, the presumption in favor of capture was so strong that “many persons suppose 
they may take them wheresoever they may be found as well in Parks as in the open Woods.” Id. 
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England’s plentiful labor and scarce land, America was uncultivated 
and underpopulated. Within a few years of settlement, every colony 
rejected the English law of trespass and enacted new laws for a new 
continent.127  Until landowners fenced their land, the public could 
travel, hunt, fish, and forage on private land without permission.128 In 
addition, stock owners could let their cattle or hogs graze on private 
land without having to seek permission. 129  Every state enacted 
statutes allowing open access to unfenced land.130 Decades, and in 
some cases centuries, later, states abandoned the American rule and 
introduced the English law of trespass.131 
In the United States, enclosed (seen also as inclosed) means 
fenced. In England, land where ancient rights have been extinguished 
by enclosure is a close, whether fenced or not. Thus, under English 
common law, “EVERY unwarrantable entry on another’s soil the law 
entitles a trespass by breaking his close.”132 In contrast, American 
jurists used the term in a more literal sense: enclosed meant fenced, 
and only incursions on fenced land were considered trespass.133 
Early nineteenth century cases can shed light on what rights the 
landowner had over open land. We can thank John Singleton, a 
particularly litigious landowner from South Carolina, for two high 
court opinions that show the limited rights that landowners had to 
exclude from open land. 
In 1818, South Carolina’s highest court noted that “the right to 
hunt on unenclosed and uncultivated lands has never been 
disputed.”134 The opinion continued: “it is well known that it has 
                                                                                                                 
 127. E.g., Act 52, 1 HENING’S STAT. AT LARGE 199 (1632) (replacing the English law of trespass in 
Virginia). 
 128. See, e.g., Nashville & Chattanooga R.R. Co. v. Peacock, 25 Ala. 229, 232 (1854) (holding that 
the common law regarding trespasses by animals had never been adopted in Alabama). 
 129. Brian Sawers, The Right to Exclude from Unimproved Land, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 665, 676–77 
(2011) [hereinafter Sawers, Right to Exclude]. 
 130. Id. at 675. 
 131. Id. at 679–80. 
 132. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 125, at *209, *209–10. (capitalization in original). 
 133. In the late nineteenth century, courts in the United States begin to use close in the English sense, 
as courts import more of the English common law, replacing indigenous traditions. 
 134. M’Conico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244, 246 (1818). 
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been universally exercised from the first settlement of the country up 
to the present time.”135 Even though the landowner was present and 
refused the hunter permission, there was no trespass. Landowner 
permission was irrelevant because, as the court held, “it is the right of 
the inhabitants to hunt on unenclosed lands,” and that right could not 
be defeated by “mere will and caprice of an individual.”136 
Two years later, Singleton returned to the South Carolina courts 
when a group of hunters entered a fallow field enclosed by a 
dilapidated fence. Again, Singleton lost since landowners were 
required to maintain their fences to preserve their right to exclude 
unwanted visitors. Like in the earlier case, landowner permission was 
irrelevant since the hunters had a right to be there. More explicitly 
than in 1818, the South Carolina court noted that England was thickly 
settled, which was not true of South Carolina. The English rule was 
“wholly impracticable” and “destructive of the interests and peace of 
the community.”137 
Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court explicitly rejected the 
English rule that owners could exclude from open land, noting that 
the rule would “require a revolution in our people’s habits of thought 
and action.”138 The Georgia Supreme Court continued: the English 
rule would mean that a “man could not walk across his neighbor’s 
unenclosed land . . . without subjecting himself to damages for a 
trespass. Our whole people, with their present habits, would be 
converted into a set of trespassers. We do not think that such is the 
Law.”139 
The landowner’s right to exclude from open land was so limited 
that some courts analogized open, but privately owned land to a 
common. In South Carolina, “[u]ninclosed land, for many purposes, 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Broughton v. Singleton, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 338, 338–40 (1820) (“There, almost every 
foot of soil is appropriated to some specific purpose; here, much the greater part consists in uninclosed 
and uncultivated forest”). Id. 
 138. Macon & W. R.R. Co. v. Lester, 30 Ga. 911, 914 (1860). 
 139. Id. 
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such as hunting and pasture, is regarded as common.”140 The court 
was quick to note the limits of the analogy, since a landowner could 
“appropriate it to his exclusive use” by fencing it.141 
Almost a century later, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it was 
“customary to wander, shoot and fish” over “large expanses of 
unenclosed and uncultivated land.”142 In addition, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the open range governed the public lands. In 1890, 
the U.S. Supreme Court found no trespass for cattle grazing on 
private land if “open and unenclosed.”143 Landowners overrun with 
their neighbor’s livestock challenged the constitutionality of these 
statutes, but none succeeded,144 which is hardly surprising given how 
widespread these laws were. 
B.   State Constitutional Provisions 
When the Fourth Amendment was drafted, two state constitutions 
explicitly guaranteed a public right to hunt on open land. Necessarily, 
landowners had no right to exclude from unfenced land and thus 
unwanted intrusions were not actionable. 
In 1777, Vermont adopted its first constitution which guaranteed 
its citizens the “liberty to hunt and fowl, in seasonable times, on the 
lands they hold, and on other lands (not enclosed).”145 Additionally, 
inhabitants had the liberty “in like manner, to fish in all boatable and 
other waters, not private property.” 146  Vermont adopted new 
constitutions in 1786 and 1793 which preserved the provision.147 
Since enclosed meant fenced in America, the liberty to hunt extended 
to unfenced land, regardless of ownership or permission. In 1902, the 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Law v. Nettles, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 447, 447 (S.C. Ct. App. 1831). 
 141. Id. 
 142. McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922). 
 143. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890). 
 144. E.g., Wills v. Waters, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 351, 352. (1869) (“[W]e entertain no doubt of the 
constitutionality of the statutes”). 
 145. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § 39. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Compare VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § 39, with VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. 2, § 37, and VT. CONST. 
of 1793, ch. 2, § 40. The current constitution preserves the provision. VT. CONST. ch 2, § 67. 
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Vermont Supreme Court held that hunting on unfenced land was not 
a trespass on account of this provision.148 
Most historical sources treat fenced and enclosed as synonyms 
without elaboration, but the Vermont Supreme Court provided a 
more detailed definition. Interpreting a 1797 statute, the Supreme 
Court of Vermont held that the “word enclosure therefore imports, 
land enclosed with something more than the imaginary boundary 
line, that there should be some visible or tangible obstruction, such as 
a fence, hedge, ditch or something equivalent.”149 
Vermont’s constitutional guarantee mimics an earlier 
constitutional provision from Pennsylvania. In 1776, Pennsylvania 
adopted a new constitution, which guaranteed: “The inhabitants of 
this state shall have liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable times on 
the lands they hold, and on all other lands therein not inclosed; and in 
like manner to fish in all boatable waters, and others not private 
property.”150 Pennsylvania first guaranteed the liberty to hunt and 
fish in 1683.151 The 1683 provision guaranteed a broader right to fish, 
including the “liberty to draw his or their Fish on shore on any mans 
Lands” providing the water was boatable. 152  After the Fourth 
Amendment was drafted, but before ratification, Pennsylvania 
adopted a new constitution without an express provision but 
continued to endorse a right of access to public and privately owned 
bodies of water for fishing.153 
At the Constitutional Convention, members of Pennsylvania’s 
delegation proposed a parallel provision along with the Bill of 
Rights. When their proposal was not adopted, the dissenters 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Payne v. Gould, 52 A. 421, 421, 422 (Vt. 1902). 
 149. Porter v. Aldrich, 39 Vt. 326, 331 (1866) (interpreting 1797 fence law, which allowed for the 
impounding of cattle damage feasant in the landowner’s enclosure) (emphasis in original). 
 150. PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. 2, § 43. 
 151. PA. FRAME OF GOV’T of 1683, § 22. The third Frame preserved the provision. PA. FRAME OF 
GOV’T of 1696. The first and fourth Frame (also called the Charter of Privileges) did not include the 
provision. PA. FRAME OF GOV’T of 1682; PA. CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES of 1701. 
 152. PA. FRAME OF GOV’T of 1683, § 22 (adding “not to the detriment or annoyance of the Owner 
thereof, except such Lands as do lie upon Inland Rivulets that are not Boatable, or which are or may be 
hereafter erected into Mannors”) 
 153. PA. CONST. of 1790. 
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published a tract explaining their objections to the draft 
constitution.154 
C.   Related Colonial and Early Republic Statutes 
Only two states, Pennsylvania and Vermont, constitutionalized a 
public right to use open land. In the other states, unfettered public 
access to open land was the norm, even if it did not receive 
constitutional protection. 155  In the eighteenth century, legislatures 
shaped the boundaries of private property law in law. In particular, 
statutes defined trespasses and acknowledged the right to hunt and 
fish on private land. 
1.   Trespass Statutes 
Every statute is drafted in the shadow of existing law, whether 
common or statutory. Contemporary statutes are evidence of what 
trespass meant in 1791. In three states, the legislature expanded 
common law trespass to protect the property rights of landowners. 
The legislatures both extended the protections of the common law 
and softened the procedural protections that defendants otherwise 
enjoyed. After these statutes, landowners had broader rights over 
their property—rights that were also easier to vindicate. The 
significance of these statutes is that the statutes show the very limited 
protections afforded to landowners by common law trespass. Unlike 
that of England, trespass in eighteenth century American law was a 
limited protection that applied only to improved land and chattels. 
Like in the case law, eighteenth century legislatures used the word 
trespass to mean several different wrongs, none of which included a 
mere unwanted entry onto private land. Trespass as defined by statute 
covers wrongs that today would be classified or protected by other 
doctrines of tort law and, to some extent, criminal law. 
                                                                                                                 
 154. ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION, OF THE STATE OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (1787). 
 155. Sawers, Right to Exclude, supra note 129, at 674–76. 
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The earliest colonial statute expanding trespass allows neighboring 
property owners to recover in trespass when fires escape from one 
property and destroy buildings or other valuable improvements on 
another property.156 At common law, a plaintiff may not have been 
able to recover because the defendant did not touch the plaintiff’s 
property. While the plaintiff could have pleaded trespass on the case 
(often just called case), the legislature decided that remedy was 
ineffective. Negligence as a doctrine did not develop until the 
nineteenth century, so plaintiffs had no remedy based on defendants’ 
failure to exercise due care.157 
After independence, Connecticut modified the common law of 
trespass to allow recovery for another type of wrong which today 
would not be considered a trespass. In 1789, the Connecticut 
legislature modified the common law rule that owners were only 
liable if a dog’s vicious nature was known, often called the “one bite 
rule.” Allowing each dog to attack at least once before any recovery 
made sheep rearing more difficult. In response to the threat of dogs 
killing sheep, the Connecticut legislature enacted a trespass statute to 
allow sheep owners to recover. The owners of sheep injured by dogs 
could recover “by action, of trespass.”158 
Three states enacted trespass statutes analogous to what wrongs 
and remedies are considered trespass in current property law. One of 
the statutes addressed illegal settlement; squatting on open land was a 
persistent problem during the western expansion of the United States. 
The remaining statutes cover a variety of wrongs, most of which are 
some form of theft. None of the trespass statutes penalize or 
proscribe merely entering land without permission. All require some 
further act, whether settlement, the removal of some valuable 
resource, or destroying or damaging some improvement on the land. 
                                                                                                                 
 156. 1731 Conn. Pub. Acts 407, 408. 
 157. More than a century later, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court articulated a theory of torts 
that did not rely on the plaintiff’s choice between trespass and case. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 
Cush.) 292, 296 (1850). 
 158. 1789 Conn. Pub. Acts 388, 388 (altering the law for those affected by “dogs . . . accustomed to 
do such mischief” as attacking sheep). 
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Like other states, New Hampshire struggled to control the frontier 
with many farmers settling on land they did not own. In 1778, New 
Hampshire responded to “sundry evil minded persons” who had 
settled on unclaimed land with an “ACT to prevent trespasses on the 
waste lands within this State.” 159  The trespasses prevented were 
settlement: no person could “enter into, or take possession of any of 
the waste lands.”160 The contemporary usage of waste to describe 
lands included both land that could not be used and land that had not 
been put to use.161 The statute did not mean to protect usable land 
but, instead, to prevent settlement on undeveloped land. The 
disjunctive phrase “enter into, or take possession” indicates that enter 
is used in its technical sense in property, not in the ordinary sense 
often used in common language and occasionally other bodies of law. 
As a term of art in property law, enter means to take possession, i.e. 
to be seised of the property. Thus, trespass did not include crossing 
private land under the statute. 
Early in the eighteenth century, Connecticut enacted a trespass 
statute to protect landowners from invasions of their property 
rights.162 The existing common law provided insufficient remedies 
for landowners who suffered at the hands of a variety of interlopers 
who removed valuable natural resources or damaged valuable 
improvements. In addition to broadening the protection for property, 
the statute also provided for special procedures to ease recovery. 
Dissatisfied that trespassers were rarely punished, Connecticut 
enacted a statute for the “more Effectual Detecting and Punishing 
Trespass.”163 Under the statute, trespass included logging another’s 
land without permission and damaging fences.164 Noting that trespass 
was “very hard and difficult to Detect or Convict,” the statute 
allowed recovery in cases where the evidence was weak.165 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Act of Feb. 15, 1791, 1792 N.H. Laws 261, 261. 
 160. Id. at 262. 
 161. Id. (defining waste as any “unappropriated” or “forfeited” lands). 
 162. 1723–1730 Conn. Pub. Acts 329, 329. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 329–30. 
 165. Id. at 330 (allowing uncontroverted oaths to serve as proof). 
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In 1791, New Hampshire passed a similar statute which borrowed 
some of the language from Connecticut’s earlier statute. 166  In 
addition, New Hampshire’s statute proscribed altering the marks on 
logs in a river and penalized mining without landowner 
permission.167 Someone who changed the markings would be able to 
sell timber logged and owned by someone else. 
In the decade that followed, New Hampshire enacted two more 
trespass statutes to regulate the harvest and removal of valuable 
natural resources. One resource was flattsweed, which grew in salt 
marshes along New Hamsphire’s coast. In 1794, New Hampshire 
made the removal of flattsweed from a salt marsh without the 
landowner’s permission a trespass. 168  The other resource was 
seaweed, which many farmers used for fertilizer. If the seaweed was 
left somewhere between the ocean and the farm, however, its rotting 
was a nuisance worthy of state intervention. In 1800, the New 
Hampshire legislature enacted a statute making it a trespass to leave 
rotting seaweed near the seashore.169 
In 1787, Vermont enacted a similar statute, making logging 
without permission a trespass. 170  Like many trespass statutes, 
Vermont specified penalties greater than damages at common law. 
For trees less than one foot in diameter, the penalty was five 
shillings; for one foot trees the penalty was ten shillings; and fifteen 
shillings for all trees larger than one foot.171 Like in other states, 
Vermont made it a trespass to “throw down, or leave open, any bars, 
gates, fence or fences.”172 Also, the statute allowed those harmed by 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Act of Feb. 15, 1791, 1792 N.H. Laws 259, 259. The preamble is almost identical to the 
Connecticut statute. Compare id., with 1726 Conn. Pub. Acts 329, 330. 
 167. Act of Feb. 15, 1791, 1792 N.H. Laws 259, 259–60. 
 168. Act of Jan. 15, 1794, 1793 N.H. Laws 461 (trespass to remove “Flattsweed” from salt marshes). 
 169. Act of June 14, 1800, 1800 N.H. Laws 564 (trespass to leave rotting seaweed near shoreline). 
 170. Act of Mar. 3, 1787, 1787 Vt. Acts & Resolves 160, 160. 
 171. Id. If the court found trespass was by mistake and that the defendant “really believed” he was 
logging on his own land or land he had permission to log, then the penalty was merely the value of the 
timber removed. Id. at 161. If the timber was used for repairing roads or bridges, penalty was the “just 
value” of the timber. Id. 
 172. Id. The statute imposed double the damages as penalty. Id. The statute set a higher penalty for 
wearing disguises and beating people while damaging fences. Id. 
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fires to recover in trespass.173 Finally, the statute allowed landowners 
to sue for trespass those who removed grass, grain, or fruit.174 
In 1780, Pennsylvania enacted a law to protect absent landowners 
from unlawful logging.175 The statute’s preamble described logging 
land without permission as “great trespasses and waste thereon, by 
felling of timber.”176 
In 1806, New York enacted a statute entitled “An ACT to prevent 
Trespasses on Land.” 177  Like other states that enacted a trespass 
remedy for logging another’s land without permission, New York 
imposed treble damages.178 If the court, however, was satisfied that it 
was a “mistake,” then the plaintiff landowner could only recover the 
value of the logs removed plus costs.179 Where the lumber had been 
used for making or repairing public roads or bridges, the landowner 
was limited to the “just value” of the timber logged.180 
In 1721, South Carolina adopted an English statute from 1545 that 
allowed treble damages in trespass for specified wrongs. 181  The 
proscribed acts included burning another’s cart, firewood, 
construction materials, or cutting cattle tongues or human ears, or 
barking fruit trees.182 
Several states allowed turnpikes to plead trespass against those 
who damaged the turnpike gate when trying to avoid paying the poll. 
In 1796, Vermont made it a trespass to “cut, break down, or destroy 
such turnpike gate” or to “forcibly pass, or attempt by force to pass” 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Id. Plaintiffs could not recover for fire damage arising from “inevitable accident.” Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Act of Mar. 16, 1780, § 1, 1780 Pa. Laws 331, 331. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Act of Apr. 9, 1805, 1804 N.Y. Laws 247, 247. Generally, post-enactment evidence is 
considered weaker. This author used “trefpafs” as the dividing line between contemporary and ex post. 
In the eighteenth century, every other s was medial, i.e., rendered as a long s. Thrifty colonial printers 
substituted the f type rather than the proper type ʃ. The Constitution and Bill of Rights were written and 
printed with the medial s, while the Acts of Congress were printed entirely with the modern s starting in 
1804. 
 178. Id. at 248. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. 1721 S.C. Acts 57. 
 182. Id. 
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without paying.183 The turnpike could only recover in trespass if the 
defendant had damaged the turnpike gate. If the traveler avoided 
payment without damaging the gate, by passing on the side of the 
road, then the turnpike company could recover three times the toll by 
pleading “debt on the case.”184 
Similarly, New York’s legislature enacted a statute making it a 
trespass to avoid paying the toll on a turnpike. 185  New York 
penalized those who damaged bridges also; there, the recovery in 
trespass was treble damages.186 
Perhaps the most important trespass statute from the eighteenth 
century comes from Rhode Island. Noting that trespass did not deter 
“evil-minded Persons” who had “wilfully wickedly and wantonly” 
stolen melons, the legislature declared melon stealing to be 
larceny. 187  The significance is not that Rhode Islanders were 
tormented by melon stealers, but that trespass was not a sufficient 
remedy. The Rhode Island legislature enacted the melon protection 
act because trespass was insufficient to protect the landowner’s 
investment-backed expectations in their melons. The inescapable 
conclusion is that trespass in colonial America is very different than 
trespass in England. Trespass is not the imagined robust remedy of 
Blackstone that many American legal scholars have embraced but 
instead a very limited protection for exclusive property rights. 
A colonial statute from South Carolina provides further evidence 
that trespass was not the imagined robust remedy of Blackstone. 
Instead, trespass merely enabled landowners to recover any damage 
done to land. In 1722, the South Carolina legislature organized its 
courts and granted to courts the power to appoint special masters to 
                                                                                                                 
 183. Act of Nov. 3, 1796, § 4, 1796 Vt. Acts & Resolves 58, 62. 
 184. Id. “Debt on the case” may be a scrivener’s error since the actions were either debt or trespass on 
the case, sometimes shortened to “on the case” or “case.” Later turnpike statutes allow recovery under 
trespass on the case. Act of Feb. 6, 1804, § 7, 1804 Vt. Acts & Resolves 82; Act of Oct. 28, 1799, § 6, 
1799 Vt. Acts & Resolves 52, 55. 
 185. Act of Feb. 22, 1803, § 13, 1803 N.Y. Laws 257, 261. 
 186. Act of Apr. 9, 1804, § 12, 1804 N.Y. Laws 515, 518. 
 187. 1783 R.I. Acts & Resolves 32, 32–33 (June adjourned session). 
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investigate and report back to the courts. 188  The enabling clause 
indicates that South Carolina’s legislature did not understand trespass 
to be an offense against the sensibilities of the landowner but, 
instead, one where the interloper had damaged the property of the 
plaintiff. The statute authorized courts to appoint “sufficient persons 
to view the said trespass or waste.”189 If the defendant had entered 
private land without causing damage, there would be nothing for the 
special master to view. Note that several Pennsylvania statutes from 
the 1780s use the same binomial.190 
Like in the colonial case law, colonial statutes often used trespass 
as a catch-all term for tortuous wrongdoing. Perhaps the most 
interesting example comes from the 1740 South Carolina slave code, 
which creates a trespass action to allow persons held in bondage to 
contest their enslavement.191 Any “negro, Indian, mulato or mestizo” 
could allege their freedom in an “action of trespass, in the nature of 
ravishment of ward.”192 Similarly, Virginia enacted a statute allowing 
actions for trespass in the form of ravishment in cases of 
kidnapping.193 
More often, statutes did not create a new trespass action, but 
instead modified the existing body of trespass law. In South Carolina, 
the legislature enacted a special defense in actions of trespass, 
allowing the defendant to argue that the plaintiff had forfeited the 
property upon conviction. 194  After independence, South Carolina 
modified its laws governing the attachment of property: trespass was 
one of several actions where attachment was authorized.195 After the 
                                                                                                                 
 188. Act of Feb. 13, 1722, § 2, 1722 S.C. Acts 119, 119–120. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Compare Act of Apr. 5, 1782, § 3, 1781–1782 Pa. Laws 21, 22 (“waste or trespass”), and Act of 
Mar. 16, 1780, § 3, 1780 Pa. Laws 331, 332 (“trespass and waste”), with Act of Feb. 13, 1722, § 2, 1722 
S.C. Acts 119, 120. 
 191. Act of May 20, 1740, § 1, 1731–1743 S.C. Acts 163, 164. In contrast, New York’s slave code 
used trespass in the more conventional sense of tortious wrongdoing. Act of Oct. 29, 1730, § 11, 1730 
N.Y. Laws 157, 160 (“Theft or other Trespass”). 
 192. Act of May 20, 1740, § 1, 1740 S.C. Acts 163, 164. Plaintiffs held the burden of proof, except 
for “Indians in amity.” Id. 
 193. Act of Oct. 31, 1751, § 1, 1751 Va. Acts 156, 156. 
 194. Act of May 29, 1744, § 1, 1744 S.C. Acts 197, 198. 
 195. Act of Mar. 12, 1783, § 2, 1783 S.C. Acts 19, 20. 
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Revolutionary War, South Carolina indemnified General Sumter and 
his troops for any damage, directing injured parties to approach the 
legislature. 196  In another trespass statute related to the War of 
Independence, Vermont addressed property disputes involving 
“traitor[s]” whose land had been confiscated.197 The Vermont statute 
allowed defendants to “plead the general issue” as a defense in suits 
of trespass.198 
Less than a decade after the ratification of the Fourth Amendment, 
Tennessee enacted a statute to protect owners’ interests in their 
chattels.199 The owners of livestock could bring an action of trespass 
against one who disfigured, injured, or killed livestock. 200  Also, 
anyone who dug up, cut down, or destroyed fruit trees or corn was 
liable in trespass.201 
These statutes indicate two things about trespass law relevant to 
understanding what trespass law was in 1791. Firstly, existing 
trespass law did not sufficiently protect landowners from logging, 
fence damage, or even mining. Thus, legislatures in several states 
enacted laws to enhance the protections of the common law trespass 
cause of action. Secondly, entering private property without 
damaging the land was not penalized. None of the colonial or early 
Republic statutes proscribed entering private land without 
permission. None of these statutes challenged or modified the 
distinctively American common law rules that entering open land 
without permission was not a trespass. Instead, the statutes penalized 
impositions on the landowner’s rights much greater and more severe 
than merely crossing private land. 
                                                                                                                 
 196. Act of Mar. 21, 1784, 1784 S.C. Acts 29, 29. 
 197. Act of Oct. 24, 1788, 1788 Vt. Acts & Resolves 26, 26. 
 198. Id. The statute addressed four suits used to decide ownership disputes: trespass, quare clausum 
fregit, ejectment, and “other possessory action[s].” Id. 
 199. Act of Nov. 3, 1803, § 2, 1803 Tenn. Pub. Acts 44, 44. It is worth noting that Tennessee 
continued to render trespass as trefpafs in 1803. Id. See supra text accompanying note 171. Typographic 
evidence like the medial s in this statute suggests that at least Tennessee was still (somewhat) thinking 
and writing in colonial terms. 
 200. Act of Nov. 3, 1803, § 2, 1803 Tenn. Pub. Law 44, 44. 
 201. Id. § 3. Corn should be understood to mean any grain crop. See infra note 226. 
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Many colonial and early Republic statutes use trespass in the sense 
of a wrong with touching. While hardly exceptional, these examples 
of trespass as a wrong unconnected with entering private land 
strengthen the conclusions in Part III.A. For example, Kentucky 
listed “trespass for assault, menace, battery, wounding or 
imprisonment” in a 1796 statute. 202  In the same year, Kentucky 
enacted new procedural rules allowing information (instead of 
indictment) for “trespass or misdemeanor.” 203  Five years later, 
Kentucky authorized actions in trespass for thefts by administrators 
and executors.204 Kentucky appears to have copied a Virginia statute 
enacted in 1785 that allowed trespass in cases of theft by 
administrators and executors.205 
2.   Hunting and Fishing on Other People’s Lands 
Similarly, game laws that defined where hunters needed landowner 
permission are evidence of where landowners had a right to exclude. 
At ratification, only one state granted landowners any right to 
exclude hunters from open land; six other states authorized hunting 
on open land regardless of landowner permission. Hunting was not 
an exception to a general law of trespass, but was more frequently 
restricted since hunters were armed, their dogs often harassed 
livestock, and their horses trampled crops. Virginia’s trespass law 
restricted both hunting and fishing, the exception that demonstrates a 
general rule that other public uses were unrestricted. 
North Carolina was the only state that allowed landowners to 
exclude hunters from unfenced land, but even that extraordinary 
power was contingent on costly steps to notify the public. In 1784, 
North Carolina imposed a fine on hunting with guns or dogs without 
                                                                                                                 
 202. Act of Dec. 17, 1796, § 8, 1796 Ky. Acts 32, 34. 
 203. Act of Dec. 17, 1796, § 38, 1796 Ky. Acts 127, 132–33; see also Act of Dec. 17, 1796, § 7, 1796 
Ky. Acts 137, 138 (limiting the jurisdiction of district courts in cases of “assault and battery, trespass 
and actions of slander”). 
 204. Act of Feb. 24, 1797, § 55, 1797 Ky. Acts 162, 170. 
 205. Act of Jan. 1, 1787, § 53, 1785 Va. Acts 46, 50. 
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landowner permission east of the Appalachian Mountains. 206 
Landowners, however, were required to post their desire to exclude 
in at least two public places.207 One of the two public places was 
most often the county courthouse. Note that North Carolina’s hunting 
trespass statute did not grant landowners the power to exclude those 
who were not hunting. Fishers, foragers, and travelers remained free 
to use open land, regardless of landowner permission. Fishing, 
foraging, and even crossing private land were trespasses in England, 
but none were proscribed by the North Carolina statute. 
Pennsylvania’s colonial statute restricted hunting on fenced land, 
but the preamble suggests that colonial Americans understood only 
hunting on fenced land to impose on landowners. In 1760, the 
colonial legislature of Pennsylvania responded to “divers abuses, 
damages and inconveniences . . . by persons carrying, guns and 
presuming to hunt on other people’s lands.”208 The statute penalized 
hunting on “inclosed or improved lands” without permission. 209 
Hunting on open land was not proscribed, regardless of landowner 
permission. 
The state legislature had been free to ban hunting on unfenced 
land. Earlier, the legislature would have been unable to ban hunting 
since the Pennsylvania constitution guaranteed that right. In 1760, 
Pennsylvania was governed by the Charter of Privileges, also known 
as the fourth Frame of Government. 210  The Charter included no 
guarantee of a liberty to hunt on unfenced land, so the legislature was 
free to proscribe hunting on private land, yet it chose to do so only in 
a very limited manner. 
In New York, nuisance hunting on fenced land drove the state 
legislature to act. In New York, it had “long been the Practice of 
great Numbers of idle and disorderly Persons” to hunt within New 
York City, damaging crops and improvements to the “great Danger 
                                                                                                                 
 206. Act of 1784, ch. 33, 1784 N.C. Sess. Laws 364, 365. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Act of Apr. 9, 1760, § 6, 1760 Pa. Laws 227, 229. 
 209. Id. Fowling in the streets and gardens of Philadelphia was also proscribed. Id. § 7. 
 210. PA. CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES of 1701. 
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of the Lives of his Majesty’s Subjects.” 211  In 1763, New York 
banned hunting in orchards, gardens, and “other inclosed Land 
whatsoever” within New York City without written landowner 
permission.212 New York is an exception from the colonial norm in 
that it required written permission, which is considerably more 
difficult where paper and pencil were rare and some landowners were 
illiterate. Landowners, lawful possessors, and their “white Servant or 
Servants” were exempted.213 Like Pennsylvania, the preamble to the 
New York statute listed a series of harms not limited to fenced land, 
but limited the statute to fenced land. 
Earlier in the eighteenth century, Maryland banned hunting with 
dogs or guns on “Inclosed Grounds” without landowner 
permission.214  The Act extended to two other areas analogous to 
fenced land. In addition to fenced land, hunters needed landowner 
permission on islands or peninsulas “fenced across from Water to 
Water.”215 
Connecticut banned deer hunting without permission in any “Park 
or Inclosure.” 216  Deer parks are fenced hunting preserves, which 
were very popular in England.217 To recover under the Connecticut 
act, courts were allowed to proceed under the looser rules from the 
“Act for the more Effectual Detecting and Punishing Trespass.”218 
In New Jersey, the colonial statute did not distinguish between 
fenced and unfenced land, but instead between taxed and untaxed 
land. In 1771, New Jersey proscribed carrying firearms on “[l]ands 
not his own, and for which the Owner pays Taxes.”219 At the time, 
                                                                                                                 
 211. Act of Dec. 20, 1763, 1763 N.Y. Laws 441, 441. 
 212. Id. at 442 (requiring a “License in Writing”). 
 213. Id. 
 214. 1728 Md. Laws 11, 13. Like many early Maryland statutes, the penalty was set in tobacco since 
currency was very scarce. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. 1744 Conn. Pub. Acts 538, 539. 
 217. See EVELYN PHILIP SHIRLEY, SOME ACCOUNT OF ENGLISH DEER PARKS 11–12 (1867) 
(referencing the number and locations of deer parks). The Domesday Book records thirty-one deer parks 
in 1086. Id. 
 218. 1744 Conn. Pub. Acts 539, 539 (referring to 1726 Conn. Pub. Acts 329, 330). 
 219. Act of Dec. 21, 1771, 1771 N.J. Laws 343, 344. Driving deer with dogs on taxed land without 
permission was also banned. Id. 
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New Jersey taxed only improved land.220 In colonial New Jersey, 
fenced and improved lands would have been very nearly the same 
thing. Fencing with split rails or stone is exhausting and expensive 
work. No landowner would fence in any land that was not cultivated. 
Since New Jersey was open range like every other colony, livestock 
could roam freely without committing a trespass. Since landowners 
had no remedy for crop loss, landowners would fence their crops to 
protect them. Another provision of the same statute set property 
qualifications for hunting on “waste and unimproved Lands,” 221 
indicating the drafters did not think that § 1 proscribed hunting on 
unimproved land. 
Responding to commercial hunters, who took the hides but left the 
meat to rot, South Carolina enacted a unique rule. Rotting meat 
attracted wolves and angered Indians, neither of which South 
Carolina wanted. In 1769, the colonial legislature of South Carolina 
forbid hunting without landowner permission more than seven miles 
from home.222 In 1818, the South Carolina high court interpreted this 
statute in a dispute between a landowner and an unwanted hunter. 
The court concluded that no landowner permission was necessary if 
hunting within seven miles of home.223 
Before independence, Virginia had revised its laws on landowner 
permission and hunting several times. Early laws mimicked England, 
granting the rich greater privileges, but those privileges did not 
survive the mid-eighteenth century. 224  In 1792, Virginia banned 
hunting and fishing within the “bounds of another person” without 
landowner permission.225  Although other Virginia statutes use the 
                                                                                                                 
 220. Act of Dec. 6, 1769, 1769 N.J. Laws 317, 320 (setting rates for “[a]ll profitable Tracts of Land 
held by Deed, Patent or Survey, whereon any Improvement is made”). 
 221. Act of Dec. 21, 1771, 1763 N.J. Laws 343, 345. 
 222. Act of Aug. 23, 1769, 1769 S.C. Acts 275–76. More than a century later, the seven-mile rule 
remained law. S.C. REV. STAT. ch. LXXVII, § 15 at 403 (1873). 
 223. Id. at M’Conico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244, 246 (1818). 
 224. Act of Oct. 4, 1705, ch. 21, 3 HEN. ST. 304, 328 (1819) (no hunting without permission “upon the 
lands . . . of any other person” except that owners of six or more slaves may pursue injured game 
without permission); Act of Nov. 12, 1738, ch. 14, § 9, 5 HEN. ST. 60, 62–63 (1819) (no hunting without 
permission on “patented lands”). 
 225. Act of Dec. 4, 1792, 1 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VA.: CONTINUATION OF HENING 78, 78–79. 
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terms bounds in the modern sense (as a synonym for limit), 226 this 
statute probably used the term to mean fence. Virginia codified its 
laws three times before the Civil War, in 1819, 1849, and 1860. All 
three codes incorporate the 1792 statute, but those in 1849 and 1860 
refer to “enclosed bounds.”227 In 1819, the marginalia refer to the 
1792 statute, while the marginalia in 1849 and 1860 refer to the 1819 
code. The codifiers of 1849 and 1860 give no indication that they 
were changing the law. While the addition of “enclosed” might seem 
to be the codifier’s error, the addition was not removed in 1860. That 
the term enclosed was added, but not removed later, suggests that 
Virginians understood the law only to restrict hunting on fenced land. 
In 1866, Virginia enacted a new scheme for regulating hunting on 
private land.228  After 1866, the county government would decide 
whether hunters needed landowner permission to hunt on private 
land, regardless of whether it was fenced or not. If the county 
government chose not to restrict hunting on unfenced land, the 1860 
code remained in force.229 
Only Virginia restricted fishing on private land. Other states that 
required landowner permission for hunting did not require it for 
fishing. Similarly, gathering or foraging was not restricted. Since 
hunting, fishing, and gathering all remove something from the land, 
the imposition on the landowner is greater. Merely entering or 
crossing private land was unrestricted. 
Massachusetts allowed the public to cross private land in two 
colonial statutes. Massachusetts directly authorized people to hunt, 
liable only for the damage caused. In 1636, the Plymouth Colony 
enacted a statute that read “[t]hat fishing fowling hawking hunting be 
                                                                                                                 
 226. Act of Dec. 4, 1795, § 3, 1795 Va. Acts 50, 50 (“all disputes concerning the bounds of lots”). 
Also, “bounds” was used as a more general synonym for limits. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 24, 1795, § 10, 
1795 Va. Acts 3, 4 (“every militia man removing out of the bounds of one company into another”); Act 
of Oct. 21, 1793, 1793 Va. Acts 8, 13 (“go out of the rules or bounds of the prison”). 
 227. VA. CODE ch. 101, § 2 (1849); VA. CODE ch. 101, § 2 (1860). Another section of same chapter 
prohibits hunting on private land near the water in three counties. VA. CODE ch. 101, § 4 (1860) 
(prescribing fines for hunting and fishing “on the lands, or in the water courses comprehended within 
the survey of any proprietor”). 
 228. Act of Feb. 20, 1866, ch. 93, 1865 Va. Acts 202, 202. 
 229. Id. § 3. 
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freely allowed provided if any damage come to any p[ar]ticular 
[person] by the prosecu[tion] of such game restitu[tion] be made or 
the case actionable.”230 
The other colony that became Massachusetts protected public 
access slightly differently. In the 1640s, the Massachusetts Bay 
colony enacted an ordinance that read “[a]nd for great ponds lying in 
common, though within the bounds of some town, it shall be free for 
any man to fish and fowl there, and may pass and repass on foot 
through any man’s propriety for that end, so they trespass not upon 
any man’s corn or meadow.”231 “Meadow” should not be understood 
to describe unimproved land, even if cattle grazed on it. In colonial 
America, meadow referred to improved land, most often used for 
making hay for the cattle to overwinter.232 Crossing a field used for 
grazing would not damage the grass, but crossing a meadow of hay 
could damage it, by knocking the grass flat. 
Except in North Carolina, landowners could not exclude the public 
from open land. Even there, North Carolina replaced the English law 
of trespass which did not require notice with posting statute that 
required landowners to affirmatively communicate their intentions 
before any remedy was available. In the remaining states, colonial 
and early Republic statutes restricted hunting and fishing in a manner 
as to demonstrate that entering open land without permission was not 
a trespass in 1791. 
                                                                                                                 
 230. Act of Nov. 15, 1636, II RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH IN NEW ENGLAND 16 
(David Pulsifer ed., 1861) [hereinafter COLONIAL NEW PLYMOUTH]. 
 231. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 68 (1851). It is unclear whether this ordinance 
was enacted in 1641 or 1647, but the Supreme Judicial Court believes that §§ 1-3 were enacted in 1641, 
while this section, § 4, was added in 1647. Id. at 67–68. Nantucket, Martha’s Vineyard, and the 
Plymouth Bay Colony (southeastern Massachusetts and Cape Cod) were not part of the Massachusetts 
Bay Colony. See id. at 76. The Supreme Judicial Court has held that the ordinance has become the 
common law of property for the entire state. In re Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass. 
1974). 
 232. PERCY WELLS BIDWELL & JOHN IRONSIDE FALCONER, HISTORY OF AGRICULTURE IN THE 
NORTHERN UNITED STATES 1620–1860 234 (1941). Additionally, corn should not be understood to 
solely refer to maize, which was called Indian corn in the colonial era. Id. at 96, 240. Following the 
English usage, corn refers to grain, so hunters and fishers were not allowed to cross (and damage) grain 
crops. Although not strictly within the ordinance, other crops would have been protected. 
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IV.   THE DANGER FROM THIS HISTORICAL ERROR 
The previous section has made it abundantly clear that the history 
imbedded in Jones—that every unauthorized entry on land was a 
trespass at Founding—is nonsense, but is it dangerous nonsense? This 
final Part argues that the Jones historical embarrassment has the 
potential to be dangerous nonsense, but most probably in fields other 
than Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
A.   Open Fields Forever 
The majority opinion and concurrence in Jones duel on whether 
the revival of trespass in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence threatens 
the continued vitality of the open fields doctrine.233 There are several 
reasons to believe that Jones does not threaten the open fields 
doctrine. Firstly, the majority opinion expressly holds that Jones does 
not overrule Oliver.234 The majority opinion holds that the Fourth 
Amendment addresses searches and seizures of “persons, houses, 
papers and effects,” not of land or property generally.235 
But, doctrine is malleable, so the ultimate question is not whether a 
few sentences in Jones point this way or that, but whether there is an 
appetite to overrule Oliver. There is little indication at present that 
the U.S. Supreme Court or other courts want to overrule the open 
fields doctrine, so the Justices’ nonchalant approach to history could 
be of no import to the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 236  But 
doctrinal innovations often have their largest impact where the 
experts least expect. 
B.   Where Trespass Law Matters 
While it may be surprising that Jones could have its largest impact 
in regulatory takings jurisprudence, it should surprise no one that 
                                                                                                                 
 233. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950–51 nn.3–5 (2012). 
 234. Id. at 953. 
 235. Id. at 963 n.8. 
 236. Interview with Professor Lee Kovarsky, Capital Appellate Litigator (Sept. 21, 2012). 
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trespass matters most for property law. The same Supreme Court that 
is willing to constitutionalize erroneous trespass law in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence may be willing to do the same in its 
takings jurisprudence. 
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from doing an 
assortment of things, including taking “private property . . . for public 
use, without just compensation.”237 Initially, only actual deprivations 
of property were proscribed. In the 1920s, however, an anti-
regulatory Supreme Court invented the doctrine of regulatory takings 
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 238  Writing for the majority, 
Chief Justice Holmes held that “if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.”239 As a doctrine, regulatory takings cannot 
be justified on originalist grounds. There is ample evidence that the 
Founders were familiar with regulation that limited land use both to 
prevent nuisance and to further public goals. As Professor Hart has 
shown, the reason that the Takings Clause does not mention 
regulation is that the Framers “did not regard regulation as a form of 
taking.”240 
Colonial land use regulation was intrusive, dictating to landowners 
how much, how little, and in what ways landowners could use their 
property. Taken together, colonial governments imposed 
comprehensive land use planning. In many colonies, landowners who 
failed to improve their land would forfeit their title to the land, even 
if the condition of clearing the land and settling on it was not 
included in the original grant.241 Similarly, if a landowner let their 
                                                                                                                 
 237. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 238. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 239. Id. at 415. 
 240. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1258 (1996) [hereinafter Hart, Colonial]; John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early 
Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1100–01 (2000) 
[hereinafter Hart, Early Republic]; John F. Hart, Fish, Dams, and James Madison: Eighteenth-Century 
Species Protection and the Original Understanding of the Takings Clause, 63 MD. L. REV. 287, 287–89 
(2004) [hereinafter Hart, Fish]. 
 241. Hart, Colonial, supra note 240, at 1260–61 (describing laws in Delaware, Massachusetts, and 
New York). 
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land lay fallow, the landowner could forfeit their land.242 Many cities 
imposed parallel requirements on urban landowners, obligating them 
to maintain, and in some cases build, their residences.243  In four 
colonies, statutes imposed fines on landowners who failed to fence 
their land.244 The onus on landowners with valuable minerals was 
even greater. If a landowner failed to exploit minerals, the landowner 
forfeited the mine and another could work it.245 Connecticut went 
even further, imposing forfeiture if landowners did not exploit the 
resource as quickly as possible, allowing another miner to eject the 
landowner.246 
Colonial legislatures treated other natural resources they 
considered as important and valuable as minerals similarly. At least 
two colonial legislatures allowed someone to claim a site capable of 
producing water power if the landowner did not develop the site.247 
Laws requiring a particular economic use were not limited to 
minerals or water power. Many colonies compelled landowners to 
drain their land, often in a collective enterprise where the costs were 
shared regardless of individuals’ willingness to do so.248 While some 
landowners benefited from drainage, others were harmed. Riparian 
meadows produced hay and grazing with minimal effort. 249 
Compelled drainage reduced the value of marshland and obviously 
interfered with what the Supreme Court dubbed landowner’s 
                                                                                                                 
 242. Id. at 1262–63 (describing laws in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia). 
 243. Id. at 1275–79 (discussing laws in Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, and Virginia). 
 244. Id. at 1264–65 (describing laws in Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and South Carolina). 
 245. Id. at 1265 (describing laws in Plymouth Colony). 
 246. Id. at 1265–66. 
 247. Hart, Colonial, supra note 240, at 1267 (describing Mill Acts in Maryland and New Hampshire). 
 248. Id. at 1268–69 (describing laws in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina). 
 249. Id. at 1269–70 & n.111; see also JOHN R. STILGOE, COMMON LANDSCAPE OF AMERICA, 1540 TO 
1845 46 (1983) (settlements were located near marsh and meadow); A Brief Account of the Province of 
East-Jersey, in America, in SAMUEL SMITH, THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY OF NOVA-CAESARIA, OR 
NEW JERSEY app. at 540 (Burlington, NJ., James Parker 1765) (marsh and meadow were used to lure 
settlers). 
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“reasonable investment backed expectations.”250 Colonial legislatures 
often chose one use over another. 
Like today, cities and towns in colonial times imposed a variety of 
obligations on landowners to promote development in line with 
municipal goals. In some colonies, laws required density in towns, 
but other towns discouraged density.251 Many towns imposed vague 
aesthetic standards, hoping to make the city more attractive.252 Some 
towns required landowners to remove all the vegetation from their 
parcels, while others required planting trees.253 
These restrictions and obligations on landowners were so 
widespread that it is implausible to describe them as exceptions.254 
Additionally, it is demonstrably false that landowners faced no limits 
except nuisance.255 It is also abundantly clear that the Framers did not 
object to land use regulation practices. After independence, the states 
(or towns with state approval) continued to regulate in detail the 
aesthetics of new buildings. 256  Towns continued to dictate to 
landowners whether vegetation was allowed.257 
Historical evidence notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has 
expanded its regulatory takings jurisprudence in the recent decades 
and came close to constitutionalizing the doctrine of judicial takings. 
Most famously, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the government cannot require a private landowner to 
                                                                                                                 
 250. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1877). 
 251. Hart, Colonial, supra note 240, at 1275 (discussing laws in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, and New York). 
 252. Id. at 1275–77 (discussing laws in Connecticut, New York, and Virginia). 
 253. Id. at 1280–81 (discussing laws in New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, and Virginia). 
 254. Id. at 1281. 
 255. Id. at 1281; see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (describing only 
limitations on landowners as “background principles of nuisance and property law”). 
 256. Hart, Early Republic, supra note 240, at 1108–15 (describing laws in Connecticut, Georgia, 
Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia). These restrictions did 
impinge on individual preferences. Jefferson complained of the “disgusting monotony” where every 
building was the same distance from the street. Jefferson’s Draft of Agenda for the Seat of Government 
(Aug. 29, 1790), in 17 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 460, 461 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1965). 
 257. Hart, Early Republic, supra note 240, at 1115–16 (describing laws in Connecticut, North 
Carolina, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Virginia). 
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provide public access. 258  Like Mahon, Kaiser Aetna cannot be 
justified on originalist grounds since every colony allowed the public 
to enter unfenced private land in 1791. 
While Kaiser Aetna is now well-settled law, regulatory takings 
doctrine is poised for a dangerous eruption. In Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection, four justices joined an opinion finding a judicial 
taking.259 Judicial takings is a doctrine that judicial decisions can take 
property by changing settled precedents, much like an action by the 
legislature or the executive. Although it would not be controversial to 
say that a court cannot expropriate property for its own use, the 
application of takings doctrine to the common law process of legal 
evolution is revolutionary. 
The combination of judicial takings and ignorance about trespass 
law in 1791 could destabilize property law in several states. At 
common law, landowners owned coastal land from the high water 
mark, and public rights of access to coastal land extended to the wet 
sand. The Oregon Supreme Court has held that the dry sand is a 
public highway and therefore open to the public.260 In a subsequent 
case, the Oregon Supreme Court found no taking since public access 
was a “background principle[] of state law.”261 Justice Scalia (with 
Justice O’Connor joining) penned a five-page dissent from the denial 
of certiorari for the case.262 Scalia’s dissent makes it abundantly clear 
how he would decide the case (i.e., against public access). 
Additionally, he would have found that the Oregon Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 258. 444 U.S. 164, 389, 393 (1979). The Court expanded its ruling in Kaiser Aetna in two subsequent 
cases where government required public access in exchange for permission to build. Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987). 
 259. 560 U.S. 702, 707–13 (2010). Roberts, Thomas, and Alito concurred in Parts II and III of 
Scalia’s opinion, which concluded that a court takes property when its decision changes the boundaries 
of private rights. Id. 
 260. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. 1969) (noting that public had enjoyed use 
of dry sand “since the beginning of the state’s political history”). 
 261. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Or. 1993) (en banc) (citing Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1004 (1992)). 
 262. Id. at 1207 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Scalia presumed to correct the Oregon 
Supreme Court on what he deemed a misreading of its own precedent. Id. at 1210–11 n.3. Further, he 
accused Oregon of “invoking nonexistent rules of state substantive law.” Id. at 1211. 
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had effected a judicial taking. 263  Similarly, the Hawaii Supreme 
Court has interpreted its property law in a way that arguably expands 
public access at the expense of the landowner’s right to exclude.264 
Additionally, landowners in Hawaii cannot exclude native Hawaiians 
from customary use of unimproved land.265 
Hawaii and Oregon are not the only states where judicial decisions 
have created public rights of access to private land. In recent decades, 
several states have expanded the public right of access. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court has expanded access to the shoreline, holding 
that it is “not limited to the ancient prerogatives of navigation and 
fishing, but extend[s] as well to recreational uses, including bathing, 
swimming and other shore activities.”266 In Arkansas, for example, 
the state definition of navigability was expanded, enlarging the scope 
of public access to streams and rivers. 267  In South Carolina, the 
navigable channel includes improvements and artificial 
expansions.268 In Illinois, the public can boat on lakes too small for 
navigation.269 In many eastern states, only navigable waters are open 
to the public because that is the law of England. 270  Private 
landowners own the streambed but have no right to exclude from the 
waters, arguably restricting their common law rights. 
In several western states, public rights are even stronger, since the 
public can walk through the channel. In Wyoming and South Dakota, 
the river channel is open to the public, regardless of its navigability 
                                                                                                                 
 263. Id. at 1212. 
 264. In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 78 (Haw. 1968) (delimiting private from public according to native 
Hawaiian custom). 
 265. See Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cnty. Planning Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1259–61, 
1267–68 (Haw. 1995). 
 266. Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972). 
 267. See State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 664–65 (Ark. 1980) (noting that navigability includes 
both recreation and commerce). 
 268. State v. Head, 498 S.E.2d 389, 394–95 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (stating “[a]rtificial lakes along 
navigable streams” are open to the public). But see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178–79 
(1979) (stating that improvements do not expand access). 
 269. Beacham v. Lake Zurich Prop. Owners Ass’n, 526 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Ill. 1988). 
 270. Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 51–52. 
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and even when the seasonal flow has disappeared.271 Anyone is free 
to hike up the streambed, regardless of who owns the land. In 
Montana and the Dakotas, all water is open to the public.272 Public 
uses of water, such as fishing, is part of the fabric of Montana 
culture.273 
In South Dakota, the public retains the right to hunt along section 
lines, even where there is no recognizable road. 274  Section lines 
divide parcels governed by the general land survey. When 
landowners acquired the parcels, the section lines were reserved for 
public roads. Since very few of those roads were built, most of the 
section lines are boundaries between private landowners or between 
different parcels of a single landowner. South Dakota allows public 
hunting along certain roads and extends that right to section lines 
where a roadway was reserved but never built.275 
All of these states expand public access—at the expense of the 
landowner’s right to exclude. All these laws are threatened by the 
Supreme Court’s willingness to impose a mistaken view of what 
trespass law was in 1791. 
All of these states’ laws and decisions are also threatened by the 
doctrine of judicial takings. In each case, substantial time passed 
between the state’s formation and the first decision announcing the 
principle of public access. In Oregon, for example, public use of the 
dry sand was the common practice since first settlement, but no law 
validated the custom until the 1890s.276 In 1892, the Oregon Supreme 
Court held that federal patents extended only to the “high-water” 
                                                                                                                 
 271. See Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 838–39 (S.D. 2004); Day v. Amstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 143 
(Wyo. 1961). 
 272. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984); Roberts v. 
Taylor, 181 N.W. 622, 625–26 (N.D. 1921); Flisrand v. Madson, 152 N.W. 796, 800–01 (S.D. 1915). 
 273. See NORMAN MACLEAN, A RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT (1976) (depicting a Montana father who 
relates to his sons through fly fishing). 
 274. Tom Simmons, Comment, Highways, Hunters and Section Lines: Tensions Between Public 
Access and Private Rights, 2 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 240, 241 (1997). 
 275. Id. at 41. 
 276. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673–74 (Or. 1969) (noting that the public had 
enjoyed use of dry sand “since the beginning of the state’s political history”). 
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line, which was defined as the vegetation line.277 Seven years later, 
the Oregon legislature confirmed the substance of the decision by 
holding that Oregon beaches are a public highway.278 But, Oregon 
was organized in 1848 and admitted to statehood in 1859. That gap 
between the beginning of the state’s political existence and the first 
legal decisions is the pretext that judicial activists might use. These 
fears are justified. Dissenting from a denial of certiorari related to the 
Oregon’s beaches, Justice Scalia derides the Oregon Supreme Court 
for invoking “nonexistent rules” of state law. 279  Justice Scalia 
criticizes the Oregon Supreme Court for misreading Blackstone,280 
but omits any reference to the 1894 U.S. Supreme Court case that 
validated Oregon’s beach property laws. 
Since the Jones-ians assume that every state inherited the law of 
England in toto, every decision adjusting property law is liable to be 
labeled a judicial taking and thus constitutionally proscribed. Aside 
from the historical error, there are two great harms that arise when 
English trespass law is constitutionalized in the United States and 
combined with the doctrine of regulatory or judicial takings. The first 
is that the public could lose important rights, rights that we have 
enjoyed for centuries. In many cases, these rights are an important 
link to a cultural roots threatened by assimilation. 281  There is a 
second harm, since it would represent the federalization of property 
law. As the most inherently local of all law, the states are generally 
given great deference in developing their property law. The move 
                                                                                                                 
 277. Bowlby v. Shively, 30 P. 154, 156 (Or. 1892), aff’d, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). 
 278. Act of Jan. 25, 1899, 1898 Or. Laws 3, 3 (“That the shore of the Pacific ocean, between ordinary 
high and extreme low tides, and from the Columbia river on the north to the south boundary line of 
Clatsop county on the south, is hereby declared a public highway, and shall forever remain open as such 
to the public.”). 
 279. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211 (1994). 
 280. Id. at 1212 n.5. In addition to Blackstone, Scalia quotes two eighteenth century English cases and 
one early nineteenth century case from New York. Id. at 1212–13 n.5. Scalia does not appear to 
acknowledge that the Oregon Supreme Court decides what the common law (including the common law 
of custom) is in Oregon. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71, 83 (1938). 
 281. See, e.g., Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Planning Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1259–61, 
1269 (1995) (finding that strictly applying English common law would preclude traditional Hawaiian 
gathering rights). 
48
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss3/1
2015] ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS 519 
would federalize property and mark the second coming of Lochner, 
this time in property, not contract.282 
While Jones suggests that some justices are ready to impose their 
imagined version of eighteenth century tort law on constitutional law, 
the threat is larger than public access. Regulatory takings have been a 
vehicle for judicial activism and anti-democratic, regulatory second-
guessing since the doctrine’s invention in 1922.283 The true history of 
property regulation in the eighteenth century indicates that the 
Founders believed that government could regulate property. Yet, 
regulatory takings opinions like Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Commission state that landowners faced no restrictions, which is 
demonstrably false. If the same faux originalism that animates Jones 
combines with ahistorical activism of judicial takings doctrine, much 
of the property, environmental, and urban regulation that underpins 
modernity is threatened.284 
Property rights at common law are often an argument against 
environmental protection. While the term may be novel, the practice 
of environmental regulation is not. Dams were important sources of 
water power in early America but they obstructed the migration of 
spawning fish. At common law, the owner of the dam had no 
obligation to alter their dam to allow fish to pass.285 In 1791, nine 
states had laws requiring dam owners to modify or remove their 
                                                                                                                 
 282. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 1–2 (2011) (arguing that Lochner is unfairly misconstrued and federal 
courts should restrict regulation to protect or expand private property rights); Eric R. Claeys, Response, 
Exclusion and Private Law Theory: A Comment on Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 133, 144 (2012) (arguing that the right to exclude does not describe property and that property must 
include broader rights of use, alienation, and possession); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the 
Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 440 (2003) (arguing that the right to exclude is a pro-
regulation artifact of the Legal Realist movement and arguing that courts should protect broader rights 
of use, enjoyment, and alienation). 
 283. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that compensation is required when a 
regulation “goes too far”). 
 284. Note that most of the property and environmental regulations from the colonial era and Early 
Republic would not survive either. 
 285. Obstructing the passage of fish was not an offense at common law. Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 
2 Mass. (2 Tyng) 530, 535 (1807). According to Blackstone, only obstructions of navigable waterways 
were public nuisances at common law. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *167. 
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dams to allow fish to pass.286 Some of these laws were quite extreme, 
requiring that dams be destroyed, and providing for no 
compensation.287 These laws should not be understood as a limited or 
incomplete commitment to private property rights generally. Nine 
states required compensation for land taken for roads.288 
James Madison is largely credited with drafting the Fifth 
Amendment and introducing the amendment, since none of the state 
ratifying conventions called for it. 289  The same James Madison 
introduced a bill in Virginia to require dams to allow fish passage, 
without providing for landowner compensation.290 The Framers thus 
intended to distinguish actual takings of land, where title passes from 
a private landowner to the government, from regulations that limited 
the use of that land. 
The historical evidence is clear that entering unfenced land was not 
a trespass and that regulating property was not a taking in 1791. It is 
equally clear that faux originalism often leads to outcomes directly in 
conflict with the best historical research. The danger from Jones, 
particularly in light of the novel doctrine of judicial takings, is that a 
small number of mistaken, but motivated, judges will seize power 
from the more democratic branches of government. 
CONCLUSION 
Both the majority and concurring opinions in Jones are wrong 
about the state of the law in 1791. In the United States, landowners 
had no right to exclude others from open land. No eighteenth century 
case shows a remedy for mere entry. Two states, Vermont and 
Pennsylvania, constitutionally guaranteed a right to not only enter but 
                                                                                                                 
 286. Hart, Fish, supra note 240, at 313. By 1800, thirteen states had laws requiring dam owners to 
modify their dams to allow fish to pass. Id. at 292. 
 287. Id. at 294 & nn.47–48. 
 288. Id. at 309. Even where the law did not require compensation, payment to affected landowners 
was common. See id. at 313 (“Eight . . . states observed the compensation principle even in taking 
unimproved land for highways”). 
 289. Hart, Early Republic, supra note 240, at 1132. 
 290. Hart, Fish, supra note 240, at 305–306. 
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to hunt on open land. Several other state legislatures authorized 
hunting on unfenced land, implying that the public had a general 
right to enter unfenced land. 
Regardless of whether a Fourth Amendment search requires a 
trespass or the violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy, the 
government can explore open land without a search warrant. While 
the error in Jones does not affect the outcome in the case, it is 
nonetheless distressing because the Supreme Court does not 
recognize the limits of its historical knowledge. All but one of the 
justices joined opinions that relied, at least in part, on historical errors 
found in a modern treatise. Rather than recognize their limits, the 
Supreme Court is poised to make the same mistake again and in a 
case where it will matter: regulatory and judicial takings. 
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